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Green government procurement and the WTO iii
Executive summary 
One of the aspects of trade, with which the World Trade Organization (WTO) is con-
cerned, is government procurement of goods and services. Government entities purchase 
a wide range of goods and services, and have an important market impact in domestic 
economies. Through their procurement, governments may desire to pursue objectives 
and policies that are not connected directly to the primary objective of financially re-
sponsible purchasing, such as the promotion of domestic industries, which may lead to 
discrimination. Therefore, the plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement 
(GPA) of the WTO provides rules for procurement behaviour of governments.  
Government procurement can be used as a tool of environmental policy (“green” pro-
curement), but it needs to be clarified to what extent environmental requirements are 
compatible with the rules on non-discrimination and transparency of the GPA. With this 
in mind, the following research questions are being addressed in the study:  
• What are the obligations on government procurement contained in the WTO legal 
framework? 
• To what extent do ongoing negotiations in the WTO Committee on Trade and Envi-
ronment provide indications for the direction the WTO is heading in the area of 
green procurement? 
• What are the opportunities offered by the current WTO legal framework to accom-
modate a greener public procurement in terms of weighing environmental gains 
against trade principles based on Article XXIII GPA, taking into account WTO juris-
prudence? Article XXIII contains an environmental exception to justify violations of 
the GPA. 
This study was performed in the context of Work Package 12 of the EU project “Envi-
ronmental relief potential of urban action on avoidance and detoxification of waste 
streams through green public procurement” (RELIEF). 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is currently the only global organization that 
deals with the rules of trade between nations. The WTO provides for various interna-
tional agreements, which concern multiple issues of trade relations, such as the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the General Agreement on Trade in Ser-
vices (GATS). Because government procurement is still largely excluded from the multi-
lateral agreements, the GPA currently is the most important instrument of the WTO deal-
ing with government procurement. The two main principles of this agreement are non-
discrimination and transparency. The coverage of the GPA is limited in several ways: it 
does not cover all products, services and government entities of the members to the 
agreement, and also only applies to procurement above certain thresholds. The GPA con-
tains a basic non-discrimination provision, and specific provisions with requirements that 
have to be followed in a tendering procedure. These requirements concern amongst oth-
ers the composition of technical specifications, the selection and qualification of suppli-
ers, and the awarding of contracts. Currently, there are a few developments with regard 
to government procurement within the WTO that are worth mentioning. At a plurilateral 
level, the GPA is being reviewed by the Committee on Government Procurement. At a 
multilateral level, negotiations on government procurement of services and on transpar-
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ency in government procurement are ongoing. The latter are intended to result in a new 
multilateral agreement. 
In the context of the GPA, the issue of “green” procurement as such has never been dis-
cussed. In general, however, the environment has received increased attention within the 
WTO. It is therefore not unreasonable to assume that attention will be paid to the issue of 
green public procurement issues within the WTO in future discussions and negotiations. 
In 1994, a Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) was established, which is open 
to all members of the WTO. In this Committee, all sorts of issues related to trade and en-
vironment have been and are being discussed. None of the items on the agenda of the 
Committee on Trade and Environment specifically addresses green public procurement, 
but this does not make the items irrelevant to this area. Firstly, the CTE has encouraged 
WTO members to undertake environmental reviews on a voluntary basis. An environ-
mental review of the GPA could be helpful in pinpointing possible conflicts between the 
GPA and the greening of public procurement. No such review has been conducted yet. 
Secondly, the multilateral debate on processes and production methods (PPMs), and eco-
labelling criteria referring to them, is relevant for green government procurement, be-
cause PPMs are explicitly included in the list of possible technical specifications of the 
GPA. In particular, it is highly debatable if it is allowed to include non-product related 
PPM criteria in technical specifications. Although in the multilateral discussions and ne-
gotiations between 1994 and 2002 no agreement has been reached on several matters re-
garding PPMs and eco-labelling, it seems that the tensions between WTO members can 
be at least partly resolved by increasing transparency and the participation of a broader 
group of stakeholders in the development of eco-labelling criteria. This implies that it 
will be less controversial to refer to eco-labels developed in a transparent manner, with 
participation of foreign producers in technical specifications than to refer to technical 
specifications referring to ‘national’ eco-labels. 
The application of environmental criteria in procurement processes is in general allowed 
by the WTO rules on government procurement, provided that the two main principles of 
the WTO procurement regime, transparency and non-discrimination, are respected. Both 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the GPA contain general ex-
ceptions, which can be invoked when a violation of provisions of the respective agree-
ments has been found by a WTO review body. There are textual similarities between the 
environmental exception of the GPA and the exception of Article XX (b) of the GATT, 
which can justify a similar application of case law related to Article XX GATT to Article 
XXIII of the GPA. The other environmental exception of the GATT, Article XX (g) does 
not have an equivalent in the GPA. A party wanting to successfully invoke Article XX 
(b) GATT and similarly, Article XXIII GPA, needs to prove that (1) the pursued envi-
ronmental policy falls within policies designed to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health; (2) the measure was necessary to fulfil the policy objective; and (3) the require-
ments of the introductory clause (chapeau) are fulfilled. Usually, the first requirement 
does not cause any problems for the party invoking the exception. The second require-
ment of ‘necessity’ involves a process of weighing and balancing a series of factors, 
which include the contribution of the measure to the policy pursued, the importance of 
the common interests or values protected, and the accompanying impact on trade. The 
third requirement contains three subrequirements: the measure applied may not be a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, and may not constitute a disguised re-
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striction to international trade. These requirements have been elaborated and interpreted 
in WTO case law. From this case law, it can be concluded that there are possibilities to 
allow for greener public procurement based on scientific evidence. These are mainly 
given by the flexible approach towards ‘necessity’ that has been used in more recent case 
law. It seems that it is also possible to take into account environmental benefits in the as-
sessment of the requirements of the chapeau. 
Although at first sight the WTO certainly does not create a great barrier to green pro-
curement, it can be observed that the relationship between the WTO framework on gov-
ernment procurement and greener purchasing is not yet fully clarified. Some clarification 
might be provided through the ongoing discussions and negotiations on government pro-
curement and on the environment, if these topics are indeed linked. As for weighing en-
vironmental gains against trade principles, this is possible under the GPA in the determi-
nation of the necessity requirement of Article XXIII of the GPA, and it is plausible that 
environmental considerations can be taken into account in determining whether the re-
quirements of the chapeau have been fulfilled. 
On the basis of the study, the following recommendations have been formulated, divided 
into policy and research recommendations. 
Policy recommendations are: 
• Members to the GPA, including the EU and its Member States, should put the issue 
of the greening of government procurement on the agenda of the WTO negotiations 
by, for instance, linking the negotiations on transparency in government procurement 
and on environmental issues in order to start a debate on green government procure-
ment within the WTO; 
• Members to the GPA, including the EU and its Member States, should undertake an 
environmental review of the GPA or include a review of the GPA in an environ-
mental review of the entire WTO; 
• Members to the GPA, including the EU and its Member States, should suggest in 
discussions on government procurement that the exception of the GPA should also 
accommodate the environmental exception of Article XX (g) GATT; 
• Members to the GPA, including the EU and its Member States, should explore the 
opportunities of clarifying the GPA by referring cases related to green government 
procurement to the review body of the WTO; 
• The Committee on Government Procurement should provide clarification in its cur-
rent review of the GPA with regard to several Articles of the GPA relevant for green 
government procurement. 
Research recommendations are: 
• Examine the opportunities the GPA offers for green government procurement in 
more detail, in order to increase legal certainty; 
• Examine the compatibility of actual green procurement practices within the territo-
ries of (both European and non-European) GPA members with the WTO law on gov-
ernment procurement in a detailed manner; 
• Examine the diverging attitudes of members and non-members to the GPA countries 
towards green government procurement, in order to create a dialogue on green pro-
curement between different stakeholders.

Green government procurement and the WTO 1
1. Introduction 
1.1 Background and scope of the study 
One of the aspects of trade, with which the World Trade Organization (WTO) is con-
cerned, is government procurement of goods and services. Government entities purchase 
a wide range of goods and services, from smaller items like pens or paper, to major 
pieces of capital equipment, such as government buildings or infrastructure. Public pro-
curement deals with the purchase of goods and services by public authorities primarily to 
fulfil their public responsibilities.1 Recent measurements of the size of government pro-
curement markets have resulted in estimations that, globally, government procurement 
accounts for an average of 15-20% of GDP.2 Government procurement thus has an im-
portant market impact in domestic economies. Although governments try to ensure best 
value for (taxpayers’) money through their procurements, they may also desire to pursue 
other objectives and policies that are not connected directly to the primary objective of 
financially responsible purchasing, such as the promotion of domestic industries.3 This 
may result in practices and procedures that discriminate against foreign suppliers, which 
may, in turn, lead to distortions in international trade.4 However, the subject of govern-
ment procurement has not been covered by global trading rules for a long time. And al-
though the matter is still not subject to multilateral rules, the situation has gradually 
changed with the conclusion of the plurilateral5 agreements on government procurement 
of 1979 and of 1996. The latter agreement currently regulates the government procure-
ment behaviour of its signatories, based on the two main principles of non-discrimination 
and transparency. 
One of the policies for which public procurement can be used as a tool is environmental 
policy.6 Since government purchasing corresponds to a large part of GDP, and involves a 
very wide range of goods and services, public procurement may influence or enhance 
environmental protection.7 A better environment can be attained by the greening of pub-
lic procurement in a number of ways:  
• Directly, by demanding products and services with a lower overall environmental 
impact; 
• Indirectly, by putting pressure on producers to develop products and services with a 
lower environmental impact; 
                                                   
1  See Van der Grijp (1998), p. 60. 
2  OECD (2002), p. 25. 
3  See Hoekman (1997), p. 1. 
4  Ibid. 
5  Plurilateral agreements are the WTO agreements, which are not signed by all WTO members, 
and only bind those members that have signed them.   
6  These policies are sometimes called “secondary” policies. Arrowsmith (2003), p. 15, defines 
them as “those that do not relate to the main object of the procurement – the acquisition of 
the product or services”. Other secondary policies procuring entities may wish to pursue in-
clude social and industrial policies.  
7  See Van der Grijp (1998), and OECD (1999), p. 4. 
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• Indirectly, by improving the market position of environmentally preferable products 
and services; 
• Indirectly, by setting an example for other consumers.8 
Although public authorities increasingly purchase goods and services with environ-
mental considerations taken into account, doubts remain whether environmental re-
quirements are compatible with the rules on non-discrimination and transparency of the 
WTO, which are laid down mainly in the Agreement on Government Procurement 
(GPA). There is a danger that the use of environmental considerations in public pro-
curement discriminates between domestic and foreign suppliers, and that it reduces the 
transparency of the procurement procedures.9 In this regard, the greening of public pro-
curement may possibly conflict with international trade rules on government procure-
ment. The problem is that it still needs to be clarified under which circumstances the 
greening of public procurement may constitute a barrier to trade, and under which cir-
cumstances the rules on government procurement may constitute a barrier to green pub-
lic procurement.10 
In this study I will look into the WTO framework on government procurement and ex-
plore the relationship with environmental issues. This study will attempt to give indica-
tions for the directions the WTO is heading in the area of green government procure-
ment. It also seeks to explore the opportunities for weighing environmental gains against 
trade principles under the current WTO framework on government procurement. It is, 
however, not the intention to examine in detail the opportunities for green government 
procurement under the current WTO framework.   
This study was performed in the context of Work Package 12 of the EU project “Envi-
ronmental relief potential of urban action on avoidance and detoxification of waste 
streams through green public procurement” (RELIEF) (Contract EESD-EVK-2000-
00723) in the period from 1 November 2002 until 1 March 2003.  
1.2 Research questions 
The main research questions that will be addressed in this study are: 
• What are the obligations on government procurement contained in the WTO legal 
framework? 
• To what extent do ongoing negotiations in the WTO Committee on Trade and Envi-
ronment provide indications for the direction the WTO is heading in the area of 
green procurement? 
• What are the opportunities offered by the current WTO legal framework to accom-
modate a greener public procurement in terms of weighing environmental gains 
against trade principles based on Article XXIII GPA, taking into account WTO juris-
                                                   
8  See Van der Grijp (1998), p. 61.  
9  See McCrudden (1999), p. 11. McCrudden formulates these concerns with regard to social 
considerations in government procurement decisions. In my opinion, these concerns are 
equally applicable to environmental considerations, since these considerations are also not di-
rectly related to the main objective of government procurement (best value for money), and 
because these considerations may also have discriminatory effects towards foreign suppliers. 
10  See Sørensen and Russel (1998), p. 99. 
Green government procurement and the WTO 3
prudence? Article XXIII contains an environmental exception to justify violations of 
the GPA.11 
Sub-questions include: 
• Where does the burden of proof lie, if an environmental exception is invoked? 
• Which role can scientific evidence play if the environmental exception of Article 
XXIII GPA is invoked? 
• How can environmental gains be weighed against trade principles, in a number of il-
lustrative cases: 
• Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certified wood; 
• Regional foodstuffs; 
• Green electricity? 
1.3 Outline 
In the following chapter I will give some background information on the WTO and on 
the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). Some of the most important fea-
tures of this Agreement will be discussed in more detail. Finally, some attention is being 
paid to the current developments in the WTO related to government procurement. 
In Chapter 3, I will look at the work and negotiations in the Committee on Trade and 
Environment, and examine what possible directions there are for green government pro-
curement within the WTO. This chapter also points out some of the situations in which 
there could be tensions between green procurement criteria and WTO rules. 
In Chapter 4, I will examine the possibility to weigh environmental benefits of govern-
ment procurement against trade principles under WTO law in case of a dispute. I will 
first look at the similarities between the environmental exceptions of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the GPA, and then examine the require-
ments for invoking the exception of the GATT, developed in WTO case law. The impli-
cations of those requirements for the exception of the GPA will be illustrated by some 
examples in the last section. 
Finally, in Chapter 5, I will provide some conclusions, and recommendations for policy 
and research. 
 
                                                   
11  See Chapter 4. 
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2. The WTO and government procurement 
2.1 The WTO in overview 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is currently the only global organization that 
deals with the rules of trade between nations.12 It came into being on 1 January 1995, as 
a result of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. The WTO provides for various in-
ternational agreements, which concern multiple issues of trade relations. These WTO 
Agreements, which are signed by many trading nations, are at the heart of the organiza-
tion.13 The WTO not only intends to further the implementation, administration and op-
eration of the WTO Agreements, but it also serves as a forum for further negotiations 
and seeks to resolve disputes between WTO members through its dispute settlement 
mechanism. 
The main objectives of the WTO can be found in the Preamble to the WTO Charter. In 
the first paragraph of the WTO Charter, the following goals are mentioned: “Raising 
standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume 
of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods 
and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance 
with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the 
environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their re-
spective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development”.  
Throughout the WTO Agreements, a number of fundamental principles can be identified 
that run throughout the trading system.14 These include principles such as non-
discrimination, predictability and stability, transparency, and the promotion of fair trade. 
Non-discrimination basically means that a country should not discriminate between pro-
ducers from other member countries and domestic producers, (the ‘national treatment’ 
principle) and that a country should not discriminate between its trading partners (the 
‘most-favoured nation’ principle). 
The most important agreement under the WTO is the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), which is related to the international trade in goods. The two other main 
agreements are the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), dealing respectively with international 
trade in services and intellectual property rights. Other WTO agreements concerned with 
the trade in goods are inter alia the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), 
which deals with the international harmonization of technical regulations and standards, 
and the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), which is intended to 
ensure that health and safety measures are not being used to protect domestic produc-
                                                   
12  The members of the WTO include major trading nations, such as the United States, Canada, 
Japan, China, India, and the Member States of the EU. Although Russia is not a member of 
the WTO, it has an observer status. For details on the membership, see http://www.wto.org/-
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm, accessed on 31 March 2003.  
13  See WTO (2001), p. 4. 
14  See WTO (2001), pp. 5-7. 
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ers.15 There are also WTO agreements, which are - in contrast with the other WTO 
Agreements - signed by a smaller group of WTO members, the so-called plurilateral 
trade agreements. I will discuss one of these agreements now, the Agreement on Gov-
ernment Procurement (GPA). 
2.2 The Agreement on Government Procurement   
General 
When the GATT came into existence in 1947, there was very much resistance to the in-
clusion of the subject of government procurement into the agreement.16 Therefore, the 
final text of the GATT 1947 excluded  “the procurement by governmental agencies of 
products purchased for governmental purposes” from the obligation of national treat-
ment.17 Two decades later, discussions on the topic had started to take place in the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).18 These formed the 
basis for the 1979 Agreement on Government Procurement.19 This Agreement was a 
plurilateral agreement, which means that it only binds the countries that are party to it. 
The membership of the 1979 Agreement was mainly limited to the industrialized OECD 
countries. This Agreement was amended in 1987, and was replaced at the end of the 
Uruguay Round by the new Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) of 1994, 
which was signed together with the other WTO agreements.20 The GPA kept the pluri-
lateral character of the previous agreement, which means that the membership is still 
limited.21 Because government procurement is still largely excluded from the multilateral 
agreements22, the GPA is currently the most important instrument of the WTO dealing 
with government procurement.  
The objectives of the GPA can be found in the Preamble to the Agreement. It aims to 
achieve “greater liberalization and expansion of world trade and improving the interna-
                                                   
15  Other important WTO agreements related to trade in goods include the Agreements on Agri-
culture and on Textiles and Clothing, the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Agreement on Sub-
sidies and Countervailing Measures, and the Agreement on Safeguards.  
16  Many countries, such as the United Kingdom, did not want to subject public procurement to 
the most-favoured nation and the national treatment obligations. See Blank and Marceau 
(1997), pp. 31-37. 
17  Art. III (8) (a) GATT 1947. Some authors argue that procurement is also exempted from the 
most-favoured nation obligation of the GATT. See for example Arrowsmith (2003), p. 62. 
18  See Reich (1999), p. 106. Discussions on the subject also started in different regional fora, 
such as the EC.  
19  The Agreement on Government Procurement, 12 April 1979, 18 ILM 1052. It entered into 
force on 1 January 1981.   
20  For a very comprehensive study of the GPA, see Arrowsmith (2003). The GPA can be found 
at the WTO website: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gpr-94_e.pdf, accessed on 
31 March 2003).  
21  These countries, however, include some of the main economic powers, such as the US, the 
EU, Canada, and Japan.   
22  Not only the GATT excludes government procurement from its most important disciplines, 
but so does the GATS (Article XIII). The TBT excludes government procurement measures 
from all its provisions (Article 1.4). See Arrowsmith (2003), pp. 76-78. 
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tional framework for the conduct of world trade”.23 The Agreement then mentions the 
two important principles of non-discrimination and transparency.24 These principles are 
further elaborated in the Agreement. 
Coverage 
The GPA applies to “any law, regulation, procedure or practice regarding any procure-
ment by entities covered”.25 There are limitations to the coverage of the GPA, however. 
Firstly, the product and service coverage is limited. With regard to goods, the GPA uses 
a so-called negative list approach. This means that all goods are covered in principle, 
unless the goods are expressly excluded in the Annexes26 to the GPA by a certain mem-
ber.27 However, for services a positive list approach is used. This means that the Agree-
ment only applies to the services, which are included in the Annexes to the GPA.28 A 
distinction is made by the GPA between construction services and other services. The 
former are included in Annex 5 of the parties, while the latter are laid down in Annex 4 
of the parties. For construction services, the Annexes of the parties have a more or less 
uniform approach.29 For the other services, this could not be achieved. The result is that 
the lists of these services differ widely between parties.30 The fact that some members 
require reciprocity makes the lists of Annexes 4 and 5 even more restricted.31  
A second limitation of the GPA is the number of entities it covers. Annexes 1-3 specify 
for each member which entities are covered by the GPA. Annex 1 contains the central 
government entities, Annex 2 the sub-central government entities, and Annex 3 contains 
all other entities, which procure in accordance with the provisions of the GPA. 
Thirdly, the GPA is limited in that it only applies to procurement contracts, which are 
above a certain financial threshold. As with the entity coverage and the product/service 
coverage, the thresholds also differ between members. Table 2.1 shows the thresholds 
that parties to the GPA have in general determined for their different entities.32 
                                                   
23  Preamble, paragraph 1. 
24  Preamble, paragraphs 2 and 3. 
25  Article I (1) GPA. 
26  The GPA has 4 Appendices, which are an integral part of the Agreement (Art. XXIV (12) 
GPA). The first Appendix consists of 5 Annexes that contain lists and notes of each member, 
in which the coverage of the member’s obligations are determined. Appendices II-IV consist 
of lists of publications the members use to fulfil the GPA’s transparency requirements.  
27  Goods expressly excluded in the Annexes of parties are mainly military materials, but some-
times also regular products are excluded. 
28  See Reich (1999), p. 287. 
29  Ibid., p. 288. 
30  Ibid., p. 288. With the exception of the lists of the EC countries, which are almost identical. 
31  Ibid., p. 289. With reciprocity, it is meant that one member only lists a service category with 
regard to another member, if that other member has done the same. See also Hoekman and 
Mavroidis (1997a), p. 16.  
32  The exact thresholds for each party can be found at the WTO website: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/thresh_e.htm, accessed on 31 March 2003.  
  Institute for Environmental Studies 8
Table 2.1 Thresholds of the GPA. 
Entity Goods/services Threshold 
Goods 130,000 SDR33 (172,880 
EUR) 
Services  
(except construction  
services) 
130,000 SDR (172,880 EUR) 
Annex 1 entities  
(central government entities) 
Construction services Varying: between 4,500,000 
and 8,500,000 SDR 
(5,984,325 and 11,303,725 
EUR) 
Goods Varying: between 200,000 
and 355,000 SDR (265,970 
and 472,097 EUR) 
 
 
Services  
(except construction services) 
Varying: between 200,000 
and 355,000 SDR (265,970 
and 472,097 EUR) 
Annex 2 entities 
(sub-central government entities) 
Construction services Varying: between 5,000,000 
and 15,000,000 SDR 
(6,649,250 and 19,947,750 
EUR) 
Goods Varying: between 130,000 
and 450,000 SDR (172,880 
and 598,433 EUR) 
Services  
(except construction services) 
Varying: between 130,000 
and 450,000 SDR (172,880 
and 598,433 EUR) 
Annex 3 entities 
(other entities) 
Construction services Varying: between 5,000,000 
and 15,000,000 SDR 
(6,649,250 and 19,947,750 
EUR) 
Fourthly, some other exceptions that limit the scope and coverage of the GPA are possi-
ble. It has been mentioned before that some parties require reciprocity for specified ser-
vices. Parties have also set conditions to achieve reciprocal coverage of entities and/or 
products.34 In order to determine the extent of parties’ coverage, it is thus not only im-
portant to read the specific Annexes, but also to read parties’ General Notes at the end of 
the Annexes. In these General Notes, derogations from the general obligations of the 
GPA are specified for certain entities, products and/or services. Finally, the GPA con-
tains exceptions for developing countries35, and two general exceptions.36 
                                                   
33  The SDR is the currency of the IMF. As of 1 November 2002, the value of 1 SDR = 1.32985 
EUR. This exchange rate shall be used throughout this paper. For a brief explanation of how 
the value of SDR is calculated, see: http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdr.HTM, ac-
cessed on 31 March 2003. 
34  See Hoekman and Mavroidis (1997a), p. 16. 
35  Article V GPA. 
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Provisions of the GPA 
The GPA contains a basic non-discrimination provision, which determines that parties to 
the GPA are required to give the products, services and suppliers of any other party treat-
ment no less favourable than that they give to their domestic products, services and sup-
pliers (national treatment obligation), and not to discriminate between products, services 
and suppliers of other parties (most-favoured nation obligation). 
In addition to this basic obligation, the GPA contains specific provisions with require-
ments that have to be followed in a tendering procedure. The GPA does not intend to 
give an exhaustive list of procedural rules, but these rules give minimum procedural 
standards. Article VI gives specific obligations for technical specifications, prescribed by 
procuring entities. It requires that technical specifications do not create “unnecessary ob-
stacles to trade”, and that, “where appropriate”, these specifications shall “be in terms of 
performance rather than design or descriptive characteristics”, and be based on interna-
tional standards, where these exist. Article VI (1) gives several examples of technical 
specifications: “quality, performance, safety and dimensions, symbols, terminology, 
packaging, marking and labelling, or the processes and methods for their production and 
requirements relating to conformity assessment procedures”. It can be observed that 
processes and production methods (PPMs) are included in this list. Article VI also de-
mands that “there shall be no requirement or reference to a particular trademark or trade 
name, patent, design or type, specific origin, producer or supplier, unless there is no suf-
ficiently precise or intelligible way of describing the procurement requirements and pro-
vided that words such as "or equivalent" are included in the tender documentation”.  
Article VIII of the GPA contains some qualification and exclusion criteria in order to de-
termine the capability of a supplier to fulfil the contract. The procuring entity has to as-
sess the qualifications of suppliers on the basis of these criteria, which include financial 
guarantees, technical qualifications and information necessary for establishing the finan-
cial, commercial and technical capacity of the suppliers. Whatever the criteria used for 
qualification are, Article VIII (b) determines that these “shall be limited to those which 
are essential to ensure the firm’s capability to fulfil the contract in question”. The GPA 
also specifies detailed rules for the several steps of the tendering process in order to en-
sure transparency and non-discrimination.37  
Article XIII (4) (b) of the GPA gives rules on award criteria. Basically, there are two cri-
teria for the awarding of a contract. The first criterion, on which the award of a contract 
can be based, is that of the lowest (priced) tender. The other criterion is that of the most 
advantageous tender, a criterion which is based on specific evaluation criteria laid down 
in the notices or in tender documentation.  
Enforcement of the Agreement happens in different ways. Firstly, parties are required to 
publish all procurement legislation and, if requested, to explain this legislation to any 
other party.38 Secondly, they have to collect statistics on its procurements each year, 
                                                                                                                                                
36  Article XXIII GPA. See infra chapter 4. 
37    See, for instance, Article IX for the requirements related to the publication of an ‘invitation to 
participate’, Article XI for time-limits and deadlines for the tendering process, and Article 
XII for the requirements related to tender documentation provided to suppliers.  
38  Art. XIX (1) GPA. 
  Institute for Environmental Studies 10
which have to be forwarded to the Committee on Government Procurement.39 A third 
way allows for private judicial enforcement.40 The GPA also utilizes the dispute settle-
ment mechanism of the WTO in a way that is suitable for government procurement.41 It 
should be noted that there have not been many cases under the GPA and its 1979 prede-
cessor.42 
2.3 Current developments  
A distinction can be made between three current developments within the WTO system 
that involve government procurement. In all three developments, recognition of the de-
sire to deal with the matter of government procurement on a multilateral level, and thus 
to increase participation by non-parties to the GPA, can be observed.43 
The first development is taking place on a plurilateral level, within the context of the 
GPA. The Committee on Government Procurement serves as a negotiating forum under 
the GPA.44 It consists of representatives of the parties. In the Committee, discussions 
take place on various topics related to the GPA.45 The Committee decided in their 1996 
annual report to the General Council to undertake an early review of the GPA. It was 
stated that: “The review will, in particular, cover the following elements: 
• Expansion of the coverage of the Agreement; 
• Elimination of discriminatory measures and practise which distort open competition; 
and 
• Simplification and improvement of the Agreement, including, when appropriate, ad-
aptation to advances in the area of information technology.”46 
Discussions related to the review have mainly focused on the simplification and im-
provement of the Agreement. Drafting changes to several Articles of the Agreement 
have been submitted, and these are still being discussed extensively.47 
A second discussion on government procurement within the WTO is taking place in the 
context of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). It has been mentioned 
                                                   
39  Art. XIX (5) GPA. 
40  Art. XX GPA. 
41  Art. XXII (1) GPA. Special rules because of the nature of government procurement can be 
found in paragraphs 3, 5, 6 and 7 of Article XXII. 
42  The cases related to government procurement that have come before dispute settlement bod-
ies of the WTO can be found at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/disput_e.htm, 
accessed at 31 March 2003. See Marissing (1995), pp. 229-230, for a possible explanation of 
the limited use of the dispute settlement system under the 1979 Agreement. 
43  For discussions of reasons behind the limited interest of many (developing) countries to par-
ticipate in global agreements on government procurement, and possibilities to increase this 
interest, see: Hoekman and Mavroidis (1997b), and Reich (1999), pp. 350-354. See also Ar-
rowsmith et al. (2000), pp. 203-207, and Dischendorfer (2000), pp. 25-28. 
44  The Committee is established pursuant to Article XXI GPA. 
45  Such as modifications of Appendices of parties to the Agreement, the determination of 
thresholds, and negotiations on the future of the Agreement. 
46  Report (1996) of the Committee on Government Procurement, GPA/8, paragraph 22. 
47  See Report (2002) of the Committee on Government Procurement, GPA/73, paragraphs 34-
37. 
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that government procurement is excluded explicitly from the main obligations of the 
GATS. This is partly reversed by the GPA, which covers services to some extent. Article 
XIII (2) of the GATS calls for multilateral negotiations on government procurement in 
services. These negotiations have started in the Working Party on GATS Rules, which 
was established in 1995. Negotiations have mainly focused on the definition of govern-
ment procurement of services, and on its scope and coverage. Discussions on the appli-
cation of the non-discrimination principle were also held within the Working Party.48  
The third ongoing discussion on government procurement is taking place within the 
Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement. This Working Group was 
established at the Singapore Ministerial Conference in 1996.49 The Working Group is 
mandated to “conduct a study on transparency in government procurement practices, tak-
ing into account national policies, and, based on this study, to develop elements for in-
clusion in an appropriate agreement”.50 The need for a (multilateral) agreement on trans-
parency in government procurement was reiterated at the Doha Ministerial Conference in 
2001 51  
The Working Group discusses various issues related to transparency on the basis of a 
“checklist” of items.52  
The overlap between the three developments requires a proper coordination between the 
different fora.53 In all three areas, negotiations are still ongoing, and have not yet resulted 
in many documents. It is therefore difficult to predict the outcome of these negotiations. 
With regard to a possible multilateral agreement on transparency in government pro-
curement, the Declaration of the Doha Ministerial Conference stated that negotiations 
                                                   
48  For a discussion of the possibilities and difficulties of applying GATS rules to government 
procurement, see Reich (1999), pp. 356-358, Low et al. (1997), and Dischendorfer (2000), 
pp. 33-34. Reports and minutes of the Working Party on GATS Rules can be found at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gpserv_e.htm, accessed on 31 March 2003.   
49  See WTO (2001), p. 50. 
50  Singapore Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 13 December 1996, WT/MIN(96)/DEC, para-
graph 21. 
51  Doha Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, para-
graph 26. The need for enhanced technical assistance and capacity building in the area of 
transparency in government procurement was also recognized. 
52  This checklist is an informal note by the Chair of the Working Group, named “List of the Is-
sues Raised and Points Made”, JOB(99)/6782. Items on this list include: definition and scope 
of government procurement; procurement methods; information on procurement opportuni-
ties, tendering and qualification procedures; time-periods; transparency of decisions on quali-
fication; transparency of decisions on contract awards. An old version of this list 
(JOB(99)/5534) is attached to the Report (1999) to the General Council, WT/WGTGP/3.   
53  This has particularly been stated various times by the Working Party on GATS Rules. 
Dischendorfer notes that transparency issues are not excluded from the mandate of the Work-
ing Party on GATS Rules, and that this area especially requires coordination. See Dischen-
dorfer (2000), p. 33. 
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will take place after the next Ministerial Conference, which will take place in Cancún, 
Mexico, in September 2003.54 
 
                                                   
54  Doha Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, para-
graph 26. 
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3. Procurement and the trade and environment debate 
3.1 Introduction 
In the context of the GPA, the issue of “green” procurement has never been discussed. 
The Agreement itself does not include any provisions, which explicitly relate to envi-
ronmental considerations in government procurement, except for the general exception 
of Article XXIII. None of the disputes raised under the dispute settlement mechanism of 
the WTO dealt with the issue either. Finally, green public procurement is neither an issue 
on the agenda of the Committee on Government Procurement of the plurilateral GPA, 
nor is it currently dealt with in the ongoing multilateral negotiations on transparency in 
government procurement and on government procurement of services. 
In general, the environment has received increased attention within the WTO. Although 
the linkage of trade and environment issues is certainly not new55, the relationship be-
tween trade and environment has only received much attention after the creation of the 
WTO in 1995. The objective of sustainable development is explicitly stated in the Pre-
amble to the WTO Charter, with a reference to the protection and preservation of the en-
vironment. Moreover, the GATT 1994 and several other WTO Agreements contain pro-
visions that take environmental protection into account.56 
All WTO Agreements, including the GPA, address States through their central govern-
ments, and provide a framework for trade liberalization through increasing international 
competition. However, there is an important difference between the plurilateral GPA as 
opposed to the other multilateral WTO Agreements, which is related to the nature of 
government procurement.57 In private markets, governments merely act as regulators, 
whereas in public markets, such as procurement markets, governments participate as ac-
tors rather than regulators.58 Under the multilateral WTO agreements that concern mar-
ket access, the governments seek to represent the interests of the main actors in that mar-
ket, the private firms and the consumers. Under the GPA, the governments are regulating 
themselves as an actor in the public market, and are thereby restricting their power as 
consumers.59 
Because of the lack of information on the relationship between the GPA and environ-
mental issues, some parallels will be drawn here with the discussions and negotiations on 
                                                   
55   In the beginning of the seventies, the contracting parties to the GATT recognized the need to 
address environmental issues related to trade in the GATT. See WTO (2002), p. 4. 
56   Article XX of the GATT, and Article XIV of the GATS contain general exceptions related to 
environmental protection. Other provisions of the WTO Agreements related to the environ-
ment include: Article 27 of TRIPS; Article 2 of the TBT Agreement; Annex A, Article 1 of 
the SPS Agreement; Annex 2, Article 12 of the Agriculture Agreement.    
57  Obviously, there are also textual differences between the GPA and the other WTO Agree-
ments that, to a certain extent, relate to this more fundamental difference. I will not deal with 
these textual differences here. 
58  Dischendorfer (2000), p. 5. 
59  Ibid., p. 6. 
  Institute for Environmental Studies 14
environmental issues on a multilateral level within the WTO. These parallels will be 
drawn, despite the difference between the nature of the GPA and the other WTO Agree-
ments. But it cannot be said with certainty that the multilateral discussions and negotia-
tions on trade and environment are equally applicable to government procurement. The 
multilateral discussions and negotiations can, however, give some indications.  
3.2 The Committee on Trade and Environment 
At the end of the Uruguay Round, in 1994, a Committee on Trade and Environment 
(CTE) was established following the adoption of a Ministerial Decision on Trade and 
Environment.60 In this Committee, all sorts of issues related to trade and environment 
have been and are being discussed. The CTE is open to all members of the WTO. A 
number of observers from intergovernmental organizations are also represented in the 
Committee. The CTE reports to the General Council. Discussions in the CTE are guided 
by certain parameters. These include: 
• The consideration that the competence of the WTO is limited to trade policies, and 
the trade-related aspects of environmental policies, which may have a significant ef-
fect on trade; 
• The consideration that there is already significant scope for environmental policies, 
provided that they are non-discriminatory; 
• The consideration that market access opportunities are essential to help developing 
countries work towards sustainable development;  
• The consideration that increased national coordination as well as multilateral coop-
eration is necessary to adequately address trade-related environmental issues.61 
In 1996, the CTE delivered a first report to the Singapore Ministerial Conference. In this 
report, the CTE distinguished between ten trade/environment related items, based on the 
1994 Ministerial Decision. These items are: 
• Item 1: The relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system 
and trade measures for environmental purposes, including those pursuant to multilat-
eral environmental agreements; 
• Item 2: The relationship between environmental policies relevant to trade and envi-
ronmental measures with significant trade effects and the provisions of the multilat-
eral trading system; 
• Item 3 (a): The relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system 
and charges and taxes for environmental purposes; 
• Item 3 (b): The relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system 
and requirements for environmental purposes relating to products, including stan-
dards and technical regulations, packaging, labelling and recycling; 
                                                   
60   The 1994 Marrakesh Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment can be found on the 
WTO website: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/issu5_e.htm, accessed on 31 
March 2003.   
61   See WTO (2002), p. 7. 
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• Item 4: The provisions of the multilateral trading system with respect to the transpar-
ency of trade measures used for environmental purposes and environmental measures 
and requirements which have significant trade effects; 
• Item 5: The relationship between the dispute settlement mechanisms in the multilat-
eral trading system and those found in multilateral environmental agreements; 
• Item 6: The effect of environmental measures on market access, especially in relation 
to developing countries, in particular to the least developed among them, and environ-
mental benefits of removing trade restrictions and distortions; 
• Item 7: The issue of exports of domestically prohibited goods; 
• Item 8: The relevant provisions of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights; 
• Item 9: The work programme envisaged in the Decision on Trade in Services and the 
Environment; 
• Item 10: Input to the relevant bodies in respect of appropriate arrangements for rela-
tions with intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations referred to in Arti-
cle V of the WTO. 
Some of these items deal with related issues, such as items 1 and 5, and are therefore 
grouped in ‘clusters’. Discussions in the CTE have also focused on these items after 
1996. 
The relationship between trade and environment received notable attention in the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration of November 2001.62 Paragraphs 31-33 of the Declaration are re-
served for trade and environment. These paragraphs call for negotiations on important is-
sues, such as the relationship between multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) 
and trade, eco-labelling, and the effects of environmental measures on market access, es-
pecially for developing countries. These negotiations are taking place in a so-called Spe-
cial Session of the CTE.63 It is important to keep in mind that although the environment 
is not mentioned explicitly in some other parts of the Doha Declaration, trade and envi-
ronment issues may certainly play a role in other negotiations following the Declaration. 
It is for example likely that environmental issues arise in the negotiations on government 
procurement.64 Before looking at this possibility, the work and the negotiations related to 
certain parts of the trade and environment concerns, as well as their relevance to green 
government procurement issues, will be discussed below. 
3.3 Procurement and the work and negotiations in the CTE 
None of the items on the agenda of the Committee on Trade and Environment specifi-
cally addresses green public procurement. This does not make the items irrelevant to this 
area. In fact, in discussions under a few items, the subject of green public procurement 
has been raised – although very briefly. In the context of government procurement, some 
                                                   
62   See WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, paragraphs 31-33.  
63   This was decided by the Trade Negotiations Committee, in TN/C/1.  
64   See Von Moltke (2002), p. 4.   
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of the relevant items are items 2 and 3 (b).65 Before discussing the work on these items, 
it should be noted first that work performed in the CTE until now has been both limited 
and inconclusive. Limited, because the work has been restricted to examining the impact 
of environmental regulation on trade, and not the reverse. Inconclusive, since the discus-
sions in the CTE have not had any significant outcomes yet.66 This is not surprising, be-
cause many parts of the trade and environment debate are not without controversy. Ac-
tors in the debate come from a wide variety of backgrounds, and have differing opinions 
on the solutions to trade and environment issues.67 This diversity has resulted in the fact 
that the CTE has mainly served as a forum for analytical discussions on trade and envi-
ronment issues, instead of serving as a forum for negotiations on the WTO rules.68  
Discussions on Item 2 of the agenda have mainly focused on the treatment of environ-
mental subsidies in the WTO.69 These discussions will not be dealt with, since environ-
mental subsidies directly or indirectly relieve or compensate the private sector for some 
amount of environmental costs70, and have no direct relation with government procure-
ment. Other discussions under Item 2 can be relevant for greener procurement in the fol-
lowing way. Countries have conducted an increased amount of environmental reviews of 
trade agreements in recent years. The CTE has encouraged WTO members to undertake 
these reviews on a voluntary basis.71 This practice has been reflected in the Doha Decla-
ration, which encourages members to share expertise and experience with other members 
in order to perform environmental reviews at the national level.72 Canada has recently 
undertaken an Initial Environmental Assessment of the WTO. Although government 
procurement was not discussed in that document, the possibility was left open.73 An en-
vironmental review of the GPA could be helpful in pinpointing possible conflicts be-
tween the GPA and the greening of public procurement. Until now, no such review has 
been conducted. 
The work of the CTE on Item 3 (b) should be examined in relation with discussions that 
take place in the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (CTBT) and which concern 
the same topic. This part concerns the important debate on eco-labels and processes and 
production methods (PPMs). In the debate on PPMs, a distinction can be made between 
product related PPMs and non-product related PPMs. In Box 3.1 I will exemplify both. 
                                                   
65  Not all items with possible relevance for government procurement are dealt with here. For in-
stance, Item 9 of the agenda deals with issues related to trade in services and the environ-
ment. In this context, a Secretarial note mentioned government procurement of environ-
mental services. It would be outside the scope of this study to examine this topic, and every 
other possibly relevant topic in detail.  
66   See Von Moltke (1999). 
67   See UNEP and IISD (2000), p. 3.   
68   Ibid., p. 24.  
69   See WTO (2002), p. 14.  
70   See Van Calster (2000), quoting an OECD report of 1994.  
71   See WTO (2002), p. 15.  
72   See WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, paragraph 33.   
73   The document can be found at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/consult1-en.asp#wto, 
accessed on 31 March 2003.  
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Box 3.1 Different types of PPMs. 
 
Type How to distinguish74 Example 
Product related 
PPM 
Leaves a trace on the 
 final product 
Organically produced apples, compared with ‘normal’ 
apples, if pesticide residues are present in the latter75 
Non-product 
related PPM 
Does not leave a trace 
on the final product 
Tuna caught by driftnets, which also results in by 
catch of dolphins, compared with ‘dolphin-friendly 
caught tuna 
In principle, discrimination based on product related PPMs is accepted by the WTO.76 
Discrimination based on non-product related PPMs is more problematic, because these 
PPMs do not change the commercial or practical substitutability of the products. 
This criterion is being used to determine the ‘likeness’ of products, and the WTO does 
not allow for discrimination between ‘like’ products.77 If countries are allowed to dis-
criminate on the basis of non-product related PPMs, this may lead to disguised protec-
tion of their domestic industries. This is possible when the use of certain PPMs, which 
are already being used by domestic industries, is demanded. It is certainly possible that 
these PPMs are not being used in other countries, because the economic and/or environ-
mental situation in those countries is entirely different. The problem is basically the 
same for eco-labelling, since eco-labels tend to be based on a life-cycle analysis, in 
which the environmental effects of products are examined from the cradle to the grave, 
including processes and production methods. Eco-labelling may limit the market access 
for a foreign supplier. This can happen through eco-labelling criteria, which are based on 
local environmental priorities78, or through the involvement of domestic suppliers in de-
veloping eco-labelling schemes.79  
A different problem for eco-labels is that producers from foreign (developing) countries 
do not always have the technical or financial means to follow the procedure for being 
awarded an eco-label. This also reduces their market opportunities.80 
The debate on PPMs and eco-labelling is also relevant for green government procure-
ment, because PPMs are explicitly included in the list of possible technical specifications 
of the GPA81, and procuring entities may refer to them in the technical specifications. It 
is not clear whether non-product related PPMs are indeed allowed by the GPA.82  In dis-
cussions in the CTE, Nigeria once mentioned the link between eco-labelling and gov-
ernment procurement in a request to the WTO Secretariat to write a note on eco-
                                                   
74  These examples give a very black and white description of the difference between non-
product related and product related PPMs. It is important to remember that this distinction is 
not as clear as it may seem. For an explanation of this, see the remarks made by Switzerland 
in its submission to the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade on 19 June 2001, 
WT/CTE/W/192; G/TBT/W/162, p. 4. 
75  See UNEP and IISD (2000), p. 42.  
76  Ibid. 
77   Ibid., p. 43.  
78   See OECD (1999), p. 13.  
79   See WTO (2002), p. 15.  
80   Ibid., p. 49.   
81   See Article VI (1) GPA.  
82   See Spennemann (2001), pp. 60-63, and Buck and Cameron (1999), pp. 19-20.  
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labelling. This note has, however, never been written, after the United States indicated 
that this issue should not be dealt with in the CTE.83 Since then, the linkage between the 
environment and government procurement has not been discussed anymore in the CTE. 
It would probably not be disputed that technical specifications with product related PPM 
criteria are allowed, in a similar way that discrimination based on product related PPMs 
is allowed. The inclusion of non-product related PPM criteria in technical specifications 
is, however, highly debatable. 
An issue that has been raised in discussions in both the CTE and the CTBT is to what ex-
tent voluntary eco-labelling schemes based on non-product related PPMs are covered by 
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), by the GATT, or by both.84 This is 
due to the definition of ‘standard’ in Annex I to the TBT. It should be noted that the 
GPA uses the same definition of ‘standard’ in relation with the composition of technical 
specifications.85 It can therefore be assumed that if the definition of ‘standard’ of the 
TBT includes non-product related PPMs (in other words, if non-product related PPMs 
are covered by the TBT), the definition of ‘standard’ of the GPA will also include these 
PPMs. A standard is defined as a “document approved by a recognized body, that pro-
vides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or 
related processes and production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory. It 
may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or 
labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or production method”. Al-
though the first sentence of this definition seems to exclude non-product related PPMs 
from the TBT Agreement, it has been observed that the second sentence casts doubt on 
this exclusion from the TBT.86 The WTO Secretariat clarified the text of the TBT partly, 
by providing a note on the negotiating history of the TBT.87 From that note, it seems that 
members did not intend to extend the coverage of the TBT to non-product related 
PPMs.88 Certain members, such as Singapore89 and India90, agree with this interpretation 
of the negotiating history. This view is, however, not undisputed91, which leaves the 
question unresolved. A solution is desirable, but might well be unattainable, since some 
members fear that this would set an undesirable precedent for other discussions regard-
ing non-product related PPM measures.92 There have been proposals to come to a solu-
                                                   
83   See WT/CTE/M/14, paragraphs 61, 67, and 70.  
84   See Van Calster (2000), pp. 312-313.  
85   Footnote 4 to Article VI (2) (b).   
86   See Ward (1997), p. 143.  
87   See (Negotiating history of the coverage of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
with regard to labelling requirements, voluntary standards, and process and production meth-
ods), WT/CTE/W/10; G/TBT/W/11.  
88   Ibid.   
89   See the statement of Singapore (also on behalf of other ASEAN countries) in WT/CTE/M/7, 
paragraph 65.  
90   See the statement of India in WT/CTE/M/23, paragraph 27.  
91   See, for instance, the statement by the United States in WT/CTE/M/5, paragraph 109, and the 
remarks by the EC in WT/CTE/M/26, paragraph 104.  
92   See Van Calster (2000), p. 313, and Pons (2002), p. 26.  
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tion, but no agreement could be reached between the members.93 It is thus still unclear 
whether the term ‘standard’ in the TBT (and similarly, in the GPA) includes non-product 
related PPMs and eco-labels based on them, and it is therefore also still unclear whether 
the TBT applies to them. 
If the TBT were to apply to eco-labelling schemes based on non-product related PPMs, 
this would mean that certain requirements contained in the Agreement would have to be 
met. These include the pursuit of a legitimate objective recognized by the TBT Agree-
ment (these objectives include the protection of the environment)94, and adherence to the 
Code of Good Practice of the TBT. This Code includes provisions for increasing trans-
parency95 and enhancing participation96. 
If eco-labelling schemes based on non-product related PPMs fall outside of the scope of 
the TBT, their legality has to be examined in the light of the GATT 1994 provisions.97 
Certain (developing) countries claim that these eco-labelling schemes would violate 
GATT provisions. According to these countries, distinctions based on PPMs that are not 
incorporated in the product would amount to discrimination of ‘like products’, and 
would therefore violate the non-discrimination provisions of Article I and III of the 
GATT.98 There is a discussion in literature whether the GATT makes a product/process 
distinction (i.e. whether the use of trade-restricting measures based on non-product re-
lated PPMs are allowed under GATT).99 It is widely thought that the GATT makes in-
deed such a distinction.100 This does, however, certainly not make these measures in-
compatible with the GATT completely. They may be upheld through the general excep-
tion of Article XX.101 It is important that the measures fulfil the requirements of the gen-
eral exception. These requirements will be discussed in the next chapter under the condi-
tion that they are applicable to the general exception of the GPA. 
Another discussion related with aspects of market access, concerns issues of transpar-
ency in the development of eco-labelling criteria. Despite the fact that it is still unclear 
which WTO rules apply to eco-labelling criteria, there have been some efforts to en-
hance transparency.102 In its 1996 Report to the Singapore Ministerial Conference, the 
                                                   
93   See Pons (2002), pp. 23-26, where he describes proposals of Canada, and a proposal by the 
EC, which were subsequently rejected. 
94   Article 2.2 TBT.  
95   For example, the publication of work programmes containing information about the stan-
dards they are currently preparing and the standards which it has adopted in the preceding pe-
riod (provision J), and providing copies of draft standards on request to interested parties 
(provision M).  
96   For example, allowing interested parties a certain period for the submission of comments on 
draft standards (provision L).  
97   See Van Calster (2000), p. 333.  
98   See Pons (2002), p. 30. Van Calster (2000), p. 335 notes that violation of the MFN require-
ment of Article I GATT would be difficult to prove.   
99   See for a good reflection on this discussion the article of Howse and Regan (2000), who criti-
cize this distinction, and the comments of Jackson (2000) on this article.   
100   See Howse and Regan (2000), p. 251.  
101   See Pons (2002), p. 36.  
102  See, for instance, the United States proposal regarding further work on transparency of eco-    
labelling, WT/CTE/W/27.  
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CTE stated that “without prejudice to the views of WTO members concerning the cover-
age and application of the TBT Agreement to certain aspects of such voluntary eco-
labelling schemes/programmes and criteria, i.e. those aspects concerning non-product-
related PPMs, and therefore to the obligations of members under this Agreement regard-
ing those aspects, the CTE stresses the importance of WTO members following the pro-
visions of the TBT Agreement and its Code of Good Practice, including those on trans-
parency. In this context, the CTE underlines the particular importance of ensuring fair 
access of foreign producers to eco-labelling schemes/programmes.”103 This emphasizes 
the consensus that exists among members regarding the need of increasing transparency, 
even in the absence of agreement on the applicable WTO rules. One example of this 
consensus is that eco-labelling schemes are now increasingly being notified, even when 
they contain non-product related PPM criteria.104  
3.4 Indications for negotiations on government procurement 
In general, it can be observed that the environment has increasingly received attention 
within all kinds of disciplines of the WTO. It is therefore not unreasonable to assume 
that attention will be paid to the issue of green public procurement issues within the 
WTO in the future. This could take place in discussions in the Committee on Govern-
ment Procurement, or in the multilateral negotiations on transparency in government 
procurement and on government procurement of services105. Also, it is suggested here 
that the GPA should be subject to an environmental review by one its parties. 
In particular, the development of the PPM and eco-labelling debate within the CTE and 
the CTBT could set an example for possible subsequent negotiations on the permissibil-
ity of technical specifications containing references to environmental non-product related 
PPMs under any WTO government procurement regime. Although in the discussions 
and negotiations between 1994 and 2002 no agreement has been reached on several mat-
ters (coverage of the TBT; status of non-product related PPMs in the GATT), it seems 
that the tensions between WTO members (mainly between developing and developed 
countries) can be at least partly resolved by increasing transparency and the participation 
of foreign stakeholders in the development of eco-labelling criteria. As stated before, the 
CTE called upon WTO members to follow the provisions of the TBT and the Code of 
Good Practice. Through increased transparency and participation foreign suppliers are 
better able to know which criteria to rely on. This may reduce potential trade impacts of 
these criteria.106 
The present disagreement on various issues in the discussions within the CTE and CTBT 
has the consequence that indications for the direction in which government procurement 
regulations of the WTO is heading are ambiguous. The only indications are given by the 
increasing emphasis that has been put on transparency and participation of foreign stake-
holders in the development of eco-labels. This implies that reference in technical specifi-
cations to eco-labels developed in a transparent manner, with participation of foreign 
                                                   
103  See WT/CTE/1, paragraph 184.  
104  See Van Calster (2000), p. 333.  
105  One could think of procurement of environmental services as subject of these negotiations. 
106  See OECD (1999), p. 14.  
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producers will be less debated than technical specifications that refer to ‘national’ eco-
labels, because the former potentially have fewer impacts on international trade.  
Further negotiations on labelling schemes for environmental purposes were called for in 
the Doha Ministerial Declaration.107 In the same Declaration, negotiations on Transpar-
ency in Government Procurement were being called for.108 It is not unthinkable that in 
one of these negotiations, the link between eco-labelling and procurement will be made 
once more. Hopefully, this ends in a more substantial debate. Until that time, it should 
not be concluded that trade measures of governments based on non-product related 
PPMs are by definition impossible under the WTO Agreements. On the contrary, it 
should be clear that nowhere in the WTO Agreements non-product related PPMs or eco-
labelling schemes based on them are prohibited. The question is just to what extent the 
WTO allows for them. Even if referring to non-product related PPMs would be in viola-
tion of the WTO rules, measures based on them could possibly fall within the general 
environmental exception, provided that they fulfil certain requirements. This leaves am-
ple room for public purchasers to refer to them. 
                                                   
107  See WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, paragraph 32 (ii). 
108  Ibid., paragraph 26.  
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4. The general exception of the GPA and environmental 
gains 
4.1 Introduction 
The application of environmental criteria in procurement processes is in general allowed 
by the WTO rules on government procurement, provided that the two main principles of 
the WTO procurement regime, transparency and non-discrimination are respected. How-
ever, it is still ambiguous whether the use of non-product related PPMs is in violation of 
trade rules.  
Both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the GPA contain general 
exceptions, which can be invoked when a violation of certain provisions of the respec-
tive agreements has been found by a WTO review body. The environmental exception of 
Article XXIII GPA can for example be invoked when a procuring entity refers to envi-
ronmental criteria in the technical specifications, which a WTO Panel deems to be  “un-
necessary obstacles to trade” (Article VI GPA).109  It should be remembered that the 
scope of the GPA is limited, and that therefore a violation cannot be found if the pur-
chase is outside the scope of the agreement. 110 
It can be questioned to what extent environmental benefits of green government purchas-
ing can be taken into account if the exception of Article XXIII is invoked. This chapter 
will discuss in what way the environmental benefits can be weighed against their trade 
effects under this exception. In determining this, I will examine case law of the WTO 
Panel and Appellate Body.111 Because there has not been any case law relevant for green 
government procurement in the context of the GPA yet, I will examine the case law re-
lated to the environmental exception of Article XX (b) of the GATT. Before doing that, 
the similarities between the environmental exceptions of the GATT and the GPA will be 
discussed below. 
4.2 The exceptions of the GPA and the GATT 
With regard to environmental issues, the similarities between the texts of the general ex-
ception of the GATT, Article XX, and the general exception of the GPA, Article XXIII, 
should be recognized.  
                                                   
109  It has been argued by several authors that it is hard to imagine how procurement can be con-
sidered to constitute an “unnecessary obstacle to trade” and at the same time is considered to 
be “necessary”, which is a requirement of the environmental exception) These authors, how-
ever, also point out that the fact that there is such an exception implies that there are such 
cases. See Buck and Cameron, pp. 22-23, and Van Calster, p. 304.  
110  See Buck and Cameron (1999), p. 23. 
111  Most WTO disputes from 1994 on can be found on the WTO website, at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm#disputes, accessed on 31 March 
2003.  
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Box 4.1 Environmental exceptions of the GATT and the GPA. 
The introductory clause, or ‘chapeau’ of Article XX GATT reads: 
“Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in 
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any con-
tracting party of measures:” 
Article XX (b) reads: 
“(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;” 
Article XXIII (2) of the GPA reads: 
“Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in 
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent any Party from imposing or enforcing 
measures: necessary to protect […] human, animal or plant life or health […].” 
On the basis of these textual similarities I will assume that the environmental exception 
of Article XXIII can be applied in an equal way as Article XX (b) GATT.112 This would 
imply that the requirements, which have been developed in the WTO case law with re-
gard to Article XX of the GATT, have to be met in order to invoke the environmental 
exception of the GPA successfully. These requirements will be described in section 4.2. 
It can be noted that the other ‘environmental’ exception of Article XX (g) GATT does 
not have an equivalent in the GPA. Article XX (g) of the GATT provides for an excep-
tion for measures “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption”. The ‘relating to’ test of Art. XX (g) GATT is considered to be more 
flexible than the ‘necessary ‘ test of Art. XX (b) GATT. It is not clear why the other en-
vironmental exception has not been inserted in the GPA.113 If it would be inserted, there 
                                                   
112   See Arrowsmith (2003), p. 144. See also Spennemann (2001), p. 88. This view is, however, 
not shared by Kunzlik (1998), p. 207, who argues that the exception “is not intended to pre-
serve the rights of entities to adopt specifications etc. having an environmental justification 
but […] to preserve the right of the states party to the GPA to take and enforce mandatory 
“measures” […] which might otherwise be considered to infringe the GPA”. McCrudden 
(1999), p. 43, while discussing the ‘public morals’ exception of Article XXIII GPA, argues 
on the other hand that the GPA exception can be invoked to defend measures on sub-federal 
level.  
113  One author notes that the omission of the exception of Article XX (g) provides support for 
the contention that the GPA is more economically oriented than the other WTO Agreements. 
See Charro (2003), footnote 35. 
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could arguably be more opportunities to invoke the exception for procurement measures 
based on environmental considerations.114 
4.3 Requirements of the general exception of the GATT 
A party wanting to successfully invoke Article XX (b) needs to prove that:  
1. “the policy in respect of the measures for which the provision was invoked fell 
within the range of policies designed to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
2. the inconsistent measures for which the exception was being invoked were necessary 
to fulfil the policy objective; and 
3. the measures were applied in conformity with the requirements of the introductory 
clause of Article XX.”115  
Usually, the first requirement does not cause any problems for the party invoking the ex-
ception.116 In several cases under the WTO, the policy in question was within the poli-
cies mentioned under Article XX (b).117  
The second requirement of ‘necessity’, however, is more controversial. It was deter-
mined by the WTO Panel in Thailand – Cigarettes that ‘necessary’ means that there is 
no GATT-consistent or less GATT-inconsistent measure reasonably available to pursue 
the policy objective (‘the least-trade restrictiveness’ test).118 It seems, however, that there 
has been a change in the interpretation of the ‘necessity’ requirement, in that it has 
evolved from a least-trade restrictive approach into a less-trade restrictive one, supple-
mented by a proportionality test.119 The Appellate Body in EC –Asbestos stated that 
“WTO members have the right to determine the level of protection of health that they 
consider appropriate in a given situation”.120 Members are not required to apply (less 
trade restrictive) measures that do not achieve the same level of protection.121 It is how-
ever up to the WTO review body to determine whether an alternative measure, which in-
deed achieves that same level of protection, is reasonably available.122   
The determination of this involves “a process of weighing and balancing a series of fac-
tors”. These factors include the following: 
1. The contribution of the measure to the policy pursued; 
                                                   
114  However, Article XX (g) GATT also requires that the “measures are made effective in con-
junction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption”, whereas Article XX (b) 
does not impose such an extra condition. See Wiers (2002), p. 188. 
115  See US – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US – Gasoline), Panel 
Report, WT/DS2/R, paragraph 6.20. 
116  See Wiers (2002), p. 184. Wiers notes that, although the necessity of a certain measure to 
achieve a certain policy goal is checked, the necessity of the policy goal itself is not checked. 
117  See Thailand – Restrictions on the Importation of Cigarettes (Thailand – Cigarettes), Panel 
Report, BISD 37S/200, paragraph 73.  
118  Ibid., paragraphs 74-75.   
119  See WT/CTE/W/203, paragraph 42. 
120  EC – Measures Affecting the Prohibition of Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products (EC 
– Asbestos), Appellate Body Report, WT/DS135/AB/R, paragraph 168. 
121  See Arrowsmith (2003), p. 145. 
122  See, for instance, EC – Asbestos, Appellate Body Report, paragraph 172. 
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2. The importance of the common interests or values protected; 
3. The accompanying impact on trade.123 
Ad 1. The Appellate Body in Korea – Beef stated that “[t]he greater the contribution, the 
more easily a measure might be considered to be ‘necessary’”.124  
Ad 2. The Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos stated that “"[t]he more vital or important 
[the] common interests or values" pursued, the easier it would be to accept as ‘necessary’ 
measures designed to achieve those ends.”125 Furthermore, it stated that the value pur-
sued - the preservation of human life and health – “is both vital and important in the 
highest degree”.126 
Ad 3. In Korea – Beef, the Appellate Body also stated that “[a] measure with a relatively 
slight impact upon imported products might more easily be considered as ‘necessary’ 
than a measure with intense or broader restrictive effects”.127 
If the WTO review body determines on the basis of these factors that no alternative 
measure is reasonably available, the ‘necessity’ requirement will be fulfilled. 
The third requirement for successfully invoking the environmental exception of the 
GATT is given by the chapeau (the introductory clause) of Article XX. The chapeau is 
intended to prevent abuse of the general exceptions.128 Three subrequirements must be 
satisfied to pass the test of the chapeau. The first two subrequirements are that the meas-
ure applied may not be a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination. The last re-
quirement is that the measure may not constitute a disguised restriction on international 
trade.129 The Appellate Body in the US -Shrimps case pointed out what was meant by 
‘unjustifiable’. Firstly, it noted the importance of international negotiations with all in-
terested parties.130 Secondly, it stated that the measure also needed to show flexibility in 
its application, i.e. that it has to “take into account the different situations which may ex-
ist in the exporting countries”.131 The Appellate Body in the same case also gave guid-
ance on the meaning of ‘arbitrary’. It stated that the requirements of the chapeau related 
to arbitrary discrimination were not met, due to “a single, rigid and unbending require-
ment” of the US. The Appellate Body concluded that “rigidity and inflexibility” consti-
tuted arbitrary discrimination.132 The prohibition of arbitrary discrimination also entails 
                                                   
123  See EC – Asbestos, Appellate Body Report, paragraph 172, and Korea – Measures Affecting 
Imports of Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Beef (Korea – Beef), Appellate Body Report, 
WT/DS161,169/AB/R, paragraph 164.  
124  Korea – Beef, Appellate Body Report, paragraph 163. 
125  EC - Asbestos, Appellate Body Report, paragraph 172, referring to the Appellate Body Re-
port in the Korea – Beef case. 
126  Ibid. 
127  Korea – Beef, Appellate Body Report, paragraph 163. 
128  See US – Gasoline, Panel Report, paragraph 6.20. 
129  See US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (US – Shrimps), Appel-
late Body Report, WT/DS58/AB/R, paragraph 150.   
130  Ibid., paragraph 166. See also Implementation in United States – Import Prohibition of Cer-
tain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (US – Shrimps (Article 21.5)), Panel Report, 
WT/DS58/RW, paragraphs 5.66-5.67.  
131  See US – Shrimps (Article 21.5), Panel Report, paragraph 5.46.  
132  See US – Shrimps, Appellate Body Report, paragraph 177. 
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requirements of due process.133  The third requirement, finally, contains three criteria to 
determine  ‘a disguised restriction on international trade’, which have been progressively 
introduced by the WTO dispute settlement system.134 Basically, the ‘disguised restric-
tion’ subrequirement attempts to prevent protectionist practices. The Panel in the EC – 
Asbestos case seems to state that there is no disguised restriction on trade, whenever a 
trade measure does not benefit the domestic industry to the detriment of foreign indus-
tries.135  
Jurisprudence of the WTO has made it clear that the burden of proof lies with the party 
that asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence136, and that the invocation of a 
general exception is an assertion of an affirmative of a particular defence.137 In other 
words, the burden of proof rests with the party that invokes an exception. In the US - 
Gasoline case, the Appellate Body found that the party invoking an exception has to 
prove not only that the measure inconsistent with the WTO rules falls under an excep-
tion, but also that the measure fulfils the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX.138  
If the party that invokes the exception gathers sufficient evidence to raise the presump-
tion that the claim is true, the burden of proof would shift to the other party.139   
                                                   
133  See US –Shrimps (Article 21.5), Panel Report, paragraphs 5.126-5.136. 
134  The first is the ‘publicity’ test, which means that a measure would probably not be a dis-
guised restriction, if it has been published (US – Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna 
Products from Canada (US - Canadian Tuna), Panel Report, BISD 29S/91, paragraph 4.8.). 
The second criterion concerns the relationship between the three criteria of the chapeau. The 
Appellate Body determined that disguised restriction includes arbitrary and unjustifiable dis-
crimination, and that therefore considerations on the first two requirements of the chapeau 
should be taken into account in the assessment of the third requirement (see US – Gasoline, 
Appellate Body Report, WT/DS2/AB/R, p. 23). The third criterion contains a method to de-
termine the protective nature of a measure by looking at the “design, architecture and reveal-
ing structure” of the measure (see EC – Asbestos, Panel report, WT/DS135/R, paragraph 
8.236). 
135  EC –Asbestos, Panel Report, paragraph 8.239. A similar argument can be found in US – 
Shrimp (21.5), Panel Report, paragraph 5.143. If the domestic industry does not benefit from 
a certain trade restricting measure, it is of course hard to argue that there was a protectionist 
motive behind the trade measure 
136  In other words, the party that claims something has to prove it. See United States – Measure 
Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India (US – Shirts and Blouses), 
Appellate Body Report, WT/DS33/AB/R, p. 14.  
137  Ibid., p. 16. 
138  See US - Gasoline, Appellate Body report, adopted on 20 May 1996, p. 22.  
139  See, for example, US – Shirts and Blouses, Appellate Body Report, p. 14. How much and 
what kind of evidence is required, varies from case to case. Wiers (2002), p. 223, referring to 
the Panel Report in the EC – Asbestos case, notes that the burden of proof does not mean that 
a party has to prove that all other possible alternatives to its measure were unfeasible. 
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4.4 Implications of the requirements for the exception of the GPA 
It is likely that the approach of Article XX GATT used in WTO disputes is also applica-
ble to Article XXIII (2) GPA.140 The requirements for successfully invoking Article XX 
(b) of the GATT are reiterated here: 
Box 4.2 Requirements 
 
1. Policy falls within policies designed to protect human, animal or plant life or health. 
 
2. Measure was necessary to fulfil policy objective: 
a. The contribution of the measure to the policy pursued; 
b. The importance of the common interests or values protected; 
c. The accompanying impact on trade. 
 
3. Requirements of the chapeau: 
a. Unjustified discrimination; 
b. Arbitrary discrimination; 
c. Disguised restriction of trade. 
There seems no reason to assume that the first requirement would prevent procurement 
practices aimed at environmental protection.141 For example, the panel and parties agreed 
in US – Gasoline that “the policy to reduce air pollution resulting from the consumption 
of gasoline was a policy within the range of those concerning the protection of human, 
animal and plant life or health mentioned in Article XX (b)”.142 This same policy objec-
tive could be pursued by the procurement of, for instance, vehicles that run on cleaner 
energies.143 Other environmental policies pursued by (green) public procurement would 
most likely fall into the policies mentioned in Article XX (b) as well.  
The fulfilment of the second requirement of ‘necessity’ will be harder to determine in 
government procurement measures. As described in the previous section, this determina-
tion involves “a process of weighing and balancing a series of factors”, including: 
1. The contribution of the measure to the policy pursued; 
2. The importance of the common interests or values protected; 
3. The accompanying impact on trade. 
Ad 1. The first factor refers to the existence of a causal connection between the pro-
curement and the environmental policy pursued. This connection can be shown by pro-
viding evidence of a certain environmental problem and by providing evidence of the 
environmental relief that can be provided through procurement.144 It has been argued on 
the basis of WTO case law that the intensity of the causal link influences the legitimacy 
                                                   
140  See Arrowsmith (2003), p. 145. 
141  See Van Calster (2002), p. 304.  
142  See US – Gasoline, Panel Report, paragraph 6.21.  
143  See OECD (2000), p. 29-30.  
144 See next paragraph.  
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of a measure.145 Therefore, if procurement of certain greener products significantly con-
tributes to a reduction of environmental degradation, this would improve the chances that 
the procurement measure is regarded as necessary. 
Ad 2. The second factor refers to the importance of pursuing environmental objectives. It 
can be argued that the protection of human life and health, a value that has been declared 
both “vital” and “important in the highest degree” by the Appellate Body in EC – Asbes-
tos, is inherent in policies aimed at protecting the environment. If this line of reasoning is 
followed, procurement based on certain environmental policies stands a good chance of 
passing the necessity test.  
Ad 3. The third factor refers to the trade impacts of the procurement. This may imply a 
quantification of the trade impacts of the procurement and of alternative measures.146  
The third requirement of Article XXIII (2) GPA is that the application of a measure may 
not constitute unjustified or arbitrary discrimination, or result in a disguised restriction 
on international trade. As mentioned earlier, the Appellate Body in US –Shrimps laid 
emphasis on international negotiations and flexibility. This could imply that technical 
specifications referring to eco-label criteria that are negotiated on a global level, and 
which take into account multiple interests of both developed and developing countries 
will probably not be considered as ‘unjustified’ or ‘arbitrary’. However, it should be re-
alized that many eco-labels are national programmes, which mainly take into account 
domestic preferences.147 In the determination of ‘disguised restriction’, WTO case law 
refers to transparency, which implies that procurement that follows the specific provi-
sions on transparency in the GPA148 stand a greater chance of not being regarded as a 
disguised restriction.149 Furthermore, if the procurement is not beneficial to the domestic 
industry (e.g. the specified products can only be provided by foreign suppliers), it seems 
likely that a ‘disguised restriction’ will not be found by a WTO review body. 
4.5 Weighing environmental gains under the environmental exception 
In this section, I will discuss the possibilities to allow for greener public procurement 
based on scientific evidence. These possibilities of taking into account environmental 
gains are mainly given by the flexible approach towards ‘necessity’ that has been used in 
more recent case law. It seems that it is also possible to take into account environmental 
benefits in the assessment of the requirements of the chapeau.  
One of the factors of determining ‘necessity’ is the causal link between the measure and 
the policy pursued. Scientific evidence that shows a sufficient causal link between spe-
cific public procurement behaviour and a specific environmental policy can be given by 
                                                   
145  See Desmedt (2001), pp. 466-467  
146 Ibid., p. 468.  
147 See UNEP and IISD (2000), p. 48.  
148 These include provisions on time limits, publication of tender documents and decisions, and 
notifications of procurement regulation.  
149 Besides transparency, the determination of disguised restriction also depends on the outcome 
of the question whether the procurement decision is either unjustifiable or arbitrary. Pro-
curement decisions that are unjustifiable or arbitrary could also be regarded as a disguised re-
striction.  
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showing the environmental relief it provides. This is an assessment where the RELIEF 
approach can be of importance. With the RELIEF approach, a better insight into the en-
vironmental consequences of greener purchasing can be provided.150 It is now possible 
for a public purchaser to calculate the actual reductions in environmental impact as a 
consequence of green purchasing efforts.151 Such evidence would certainly heighten the 
chances of an environmental claim under Article XXIII of the GPA. The extent to which 
these chances are raised is dependent on how significant the contribution is to the solu-
tion of a certain environmental problem.  
It can also be argued that environmental benefits can be taken into account in assessing 
whether the requirements of the chapeau have been fulfilled. This has, however, not yet 
happened in WTO case law. In US – Shrimps, the Appellate Body determined that: “The 
policy goal of a measure at issue cannot provide its rationale or justification under the 
standards of the chapeau of Article XX”.152 In that case it would not matter what the en-
vironmental benefits are, since the environmental objective these benefits are meant to 
achieve cannot provide a justification in the first place. This claim has, in my opinion 
rightfully, been challenged by Gaines (2001). He raised the question that if the policy 
underlying cannot justify a measure, what can?153 The Appellate Body did not give an 
answer to that question. 
Another way of weighing environmental gains in the chapeau could be by providing evi-
dence that there is in fact no discrimination. ‘Discrimination’ in the introductory clause 
of Article XX covers both discrimination between products from different supplier coun-
tries and discrimination between domestic and imported products.154 Providing evidence 
of the environmental benefits of the purchase of certain products compared to other 
products can strengthen the argument that these products are not the same and that there 
is therefore no discrimination.155 
When determining whether a measure constitutes a disguised restriction to international 
trade or not, there also seem possibilities to take into account environmental gains. By 
showing that there are significant environmental benefits that can be attained, I think it 
will become less likely that the procurement measure is aimed at protecting domestic in-
dustry, although it is of course in theory possible that a measure with significant envi-
ronmental benefits may indeed have protectionist motives.  
It should be remembered that the evidence RELIEF is able to provide cannot reverse the 
finding of a violation of any WTO rules by a WTO review body. The RELIEF approach 
can only support the claim that the violation of the WTO rules is justified under the gen-
                                                   
150  See Schmidt and Frydendal (2003), p. 22.  
151  Ibid., p. 23. Currently, this is only possible for certain product groups and for a limited num-
ber of environmental impact categories.  
152  See US – Shrimps, Appellate Body Report, paragraph 149. 
153  See Gaines (2001), pp. 777-778. 
154  See EC –Asbestos, Panel Report, paragraph 8.227. 
155  This possibility has been pointed out to me by Jochem Wiers. It can be noted that this discus-
sion whether or not a measure discriminates under the chapeau of Article XX GATT is partly 
the same as the discussion concerning ‘like products’ under Article III GATT.  
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eral exception of the GPA. This support is not enough to base legal decisions on, but its 
use lies mainly in providing support for invoking the general exception.   
4.6 Some examples 
This section describes the process of weighing environmental gains against trade princi-
ples with regard to three specific examples. It is stressed that this only takes place, when 
the environmental exception of the GPA is invoked before a WTO review body, because 
there is a violation of one of the specific provisions of the GPA. So I will first examine 
for each case whether there is indeed such a violation, and then assess whether this viola-
tion can be justified. 
The three examples are: 
• Wood certified by the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC); 
• Regional foodstuffs; 
• Green electricity. 
FSC certified wood 
Assume that reference is made in the technical specifications of a tender to the FSC cer-
tification scheme156 or equivalent proof that the FSC criteria are met, in the case that a 
procuring entity intends to buy a wooden table made of FSC certified wood. 
1) Violation of the GPA 
To determine whether this reference to a specific labelling and certification scheme is al-
lowed, Article VI of the GPA should be examined.157 Article VI determines that techni-
cal specifications “shall not be prepared, adopted or applied with a view to, or with the 
effect of, creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade”. Arrowsmith argues that 
this means at least that specifications that exclude a product or service that meets the ex-
act functional requirements are not allowed.158 However, she also mentions that it is ar-
guable that if this happens while a procuring entity is referring to an international stan-
dard, this might not constitute an unnecessary obstacle to trade.159 The question then is 
whether the FSC standards could be regarded as international standards. It is not clear 
whether this is true.160  
If the FSC standards are not considered to be international ones, then the question re-
mains whether the specifications as described above do or do not exclude products that 
                                                   
156  See www.fscoax.org. 
157  Article III (the general non-discrimination provision) could also be examined, but Article VI 
gives stricter rules for technical specifications. See Arrowsmith (2003), p. 313. She notes that 
Article VI is not limited to specifications that are less favourable to the industry of other 
GPA parties, but also applies if the material specified is used equally by domestic and foreign 
industry. 
158  Ibid., p. 312-313. 
159  Ibid., p. 317. 
160  Sørensen and Russel (1998), p. 101. Buck and Cameron (1999), p. 21, consider the FSC as a 
prime candidate to constitute a ‘recognized body’, which would mean that reference could be 
made to its standards. 
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meet the exact functional requirements. It has to be noted first that the specifications do 
not only refer to the FSC itself, but also allow for the provision of equal proof that the 
criteria are met. So at first sight, they do not exclude products meeting the exact same 
(FSC-)requirements. But there might be products that indeed meet the same functional 
requirements (or perform even better), but do not have the FSC certificate, or are not 
able to provide proof that the FSC criteria are met.161  
Another question concerns the possibility to refer to criteria regarding processes and pro-
duction methods (PPMs), which are not product related. Some of the FSC criteria on 
PPMs are indeed not related to the product. Although PPMs in general are included in 
Article VI of the GPA, it is still undetermined if this includes non-product related PPMs. 
Spennemann argues that it is more likely that the GPA does not allow for that162, but 
there is as yet no WTO case law to back up that claim.  
From the above it cannot be concluded directly that the reference to the FSC criteria con-
stitutes a violation of the GPA. It should first be determined whether the FSC standards 
can be considered as international ones or not, if they effectively exclude other products 
that meet the exact same functional requirements, and if non-product related PPMs are 
allowed under the GPA or not.   
2) Justification under Article XXIII GPA 
Firstly, the policy has to fall within the policies of Article XXIII. Promotion of the sus-
tainable use of forests falls arguably within the policies designed to protect human, ani-
mal or plant life or health, and would therefore satisfy the first requirement. 
Secondly, the necessity has to be assessed. In section 4.2 three factors, which are in-
cluded in the determination of ‘necessity’, are mentioned. These are the contribution of 
the measure to the policy pursued, the importance of the policy, and the trade impacts. 
The causal link between the procurement and the policy should be shown by providing 
evidence of the environmental relief that can be brought by referring to the criteria of the 
FSC.163 The importance of sustainable management of forest resources should be clear. 
Determining the trade impacts is not an easy thing to do, and will depend on the actual 
situation (will any suppliers be barred from submitting a tender?). If there are little or no 
trade impacts164, and there is a high causal link between the procurement and the policy 
pursued, it can be assumed that no alternative measure is reasonably available, and that 
the procurement measure will be regarded as being ‘necessary’.  
Thirdly, if it is assumed that referring to the FSC criteria indeed passes the necessity test, 
the requirements of the chapeau have to be fulfilled. The first two subrequirements deal 
with discrimination. The question before a WTO review body could be to what extent a 
procurement measure makes a difference between FSC certified tables, and tables that do 
                                                   
161  In practice, it is hardly possible to provide the proof that the FSC criteria are met, other than 
the certification itself. 
162  Spennemann (2001), pp. 60-63. 
163  Within the scope of this study it cannot be determined what the environmental gains of FSC 
certified forestry are. 
164  This could be the case when the wood used for the table would not come from regions with-
out certifications in the first place. (e.g. there are virtually no pine wood products imported 
from Africa). 
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not have such certification. The reference to the FSC criteria applies equally to domestic 
and foreign suppliers of wooden tables, and does also not make a specific distinction be-
tween the foreign suppliers themselves. In the formal sense, there would therefore be no 
discrimination. In practice, the reference to the FSC criteria could make it impossible for 
some suppliers to submit a tender, if not all suppliers of wooden tables will have access 
to FSC certified wood. For example, there is currently no FSC certified wood available 
from Africa, and there are also no certification institutions present.165 Whether the refer-
ence to FSC criteria constitutes a ‘disguised restriction’ is a different question. The an-
swer to this question depends partly on possible impacts on the domestic industry. If 
there are relatively many domestic suppliers with FSC certification, an opponent of the 
measure could argue that the measure is aimed at protecting the domestic industry.  
Regional foodstuffs 
Assume that a procuring entity requires that certain foodstuffs (e.g. organic milk) have to 
come from a supplier within a distance of 100 km. 
1) Violation of the GPA 
Without going into much detail, it seems quite obvious that such a requirement would 
constitute a violation of the non-discrimination provisions of the GPA. By setting the 
100 km maximum, most foreign suppliers of organic milk (that meets the exact func-
tional requirements) would be excluded from submitting a tender, which would clearly 
be discriminatory, and would thus violate both Article III and Article VI (1) of the GPA. 
2) Justification under Article XXIII GPA 
First of all, the policy should fall within the policies of Article XXIII. The environmental 
policy behind purchasing organic milk from within a certain region may be aimed at in-
ter alia reducing transport distances and may therewith also be aimed at reducing air pol-
lution. As seen before, this policy falls within the policies of Article XXIII. The purchas-
ing of organic milk may also be aimed at reducing nitrate and phosphorous nutrifica-
tion.166 These are also policies falling under the scope of Article XXIII. 
Secondly, the necessity requirement should be examined. It has to be determined what 
part public procurement may play in mitigating the negative environmental impacts of 
transport. Calculations of the RELIEF project show that the purchase of milk from 
within 100 km has a significant positive environmental influence.167 In the RELIEF pro-
ject, the environmental benefits of switching from normal to organic milk have also been 
calculated. The environmental relief provided by the latter significantly outweighs the 
environmental relief of reducing the transport distances to 100 km for most environ-
mental problems.168 The policy of reducing emissions of gases harmful to the environ-
ment should be regarded as an important policy. The requirement that the milk comes 
from within 100 km could be argued to have negative impacts on international trade, be-
                                                   
165  However, it can be argued that the wooden tables produced in a sustainable manner differ so 
much from those produced unsustainable, that a reference to the FSC criteria is justified. 
166  See Erdmenger (2003). 
167  Ibid. 
168  Ibid. 
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cause it may exclude certain suppliers from submitting a tender. For instance, a milk 
supplier situated in a foreign country, 105 km from the procuring entity would be ex-
cluded. This makes the 100 km distance requirement arbitrary, however desirable it may 
be from an environmental point of view. Taking into account that trade impacts are very 
likely because of the distance requirement, the chances that these tender requirements 
will fall under the exception of Article XXIII are low.  
There is no need to consider the requirements of the chapeau, since the exception itself 
could most likely not be invoked. 
Green electricity 
Assume that a procuring entity decides to purchase only green electricity, which comes 
from suppliers that contribute to increased green electricity generation (i.e. fulfil the so-
called additionality requirement), and who can prove this by showing that the criteria of 
the EUGENE169 certificate are met. 
1) Violation of the GPA 
Again, Article VI of the GPA should be examined. The question is whether the specifi-
cations as described do or do not exclude products that meet the exact functional re-
quirements. This seems to be the case, because electricity from different sources always 
has the same characteristics. 
Another question that arises in this case is the possibility to refer to criteria regarding 
processes and production methods that are not product related. The demand that the pro-
duction of green electricity must contribute to increased generation of green electricity is 
not product related. It was noted in the first case of the FSC certified wood that it is still 
undetermined whether Article VI includes non-product related PPMs. Similarly to that 
case, it can be argued here that reference to the criteria of EUGENE constitutes a viola-
tion of Article VI. 
2) Justification under Article XXIII GPA 
Again, in the first place, the policy has to fall within the policies of Article XXIII. The 
specific environmental policy behind this procurement preference can be fighting global 
warming through the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. This policy could be argued 
to be a policy “designed to protect human, animal or plant life or health”. 
In the second place, the necessity of demanding green electricity has to be examined. 
Calculations of the RELIEF project show that if public purchasers switch to green elec-
tricity, this would provide for significant reductions of greenhouse gas emissions.170 The 
importance of the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, and of the global warming 
problem, can be shown, for example, by referring to the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change Treaty (UNFCCC), concluded in 1992, which many countries in the 
world have ratified. As a next step, the impacts on trade should be assessed. Demanding 
green electricity could exclude countries that still largely produce ‘brown’ electricity. 
                                                   
169  See http://www.greenelectricitynetwork.org.  
170  Ibid. It is mentioned that in the European Union, 1,5% of total EU greenhouse gas emissions 
can be avoided in this way, whereas the obligation of the Kyoto Protocol is 8%.  
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Although the production of green electricity is increasing worldwide, it is not yet as 
widespread as ‘brown’ electricity. On the other hand, the additionality requirement de-
mands that the electricity supplied must come from additional capacities of renewable 
energy based facilities. This is a requirement that could be fulfilled in theory by both 
‘brown’ and ‘green’ electricity suppliers, so the additionality requirement does not by 
definition lay a heavier burden on suppliers of brown electricity. Depending on the ac-
tual level of the trade impacts, and on the environmental benefits that can be attained, the 
necessity of this procurement measure can be determined. 
In the third place, if it is once again assumed that the ‘necessity’ test is passed, the re-
quirements of the chapeau have to be met. The first two subrequirements require that the 
measure is non-discriminatory. Again, although the demand of green electricity does not 
seem to discriminate against suppliers in the formal sense, in practice this may well be 
the case. This would depend on the extent to which green electricity is produced in the 
country itself, and in other countries. It might also be unattainable in practice for certain 
suppliers to fulfil the criteria of the EUGENE certificate. Therefore, the demand that 
proof is shown that the EUGENE criteria are met could amount to unjustified or arbi-
trary discrimination. It can probably not be argued that discrimination is justified on the 
ground that green electricity differs from other electricity, since this is clearly not the 
case. 
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5. Conclusions and recommendations 
5.1 Conclusions 
Although at first sight the WTO certainly does not create a great barrier to green pro-
curement, it can be observed in this study that the relationship between the WTO frame-
work on government procurement and greener purchasing is not yet fully clarified. Some 
clarification might be provided through the ongoing discussions and negotiations on 
government procurement and on the environment, if these topics are indeed linked. It is 
also possible (and desirable) that the WTO itself provides more information on the rela-
tionship between procurement and the greening thereof. Something similar has already 
been done in the European Union, where the European Commission has issued an Inter-
pretative Communication on the possibilities of integrating environmental consideration 
into procurement.171 
As for weighing environmental gains against trade principles, this is possible under the 
GPA in the determination of the necessity requirement of Article XXIII of the GPA. 
However, even if on the basis of information on the environmental benefits, provided by 
e.g. RELIEF, a measure can be regarded as necessary, the application of the measure 
must still fulfil the requirements of the chapeau. As it was argued in Chapter 4, it is plau-
sible that environmental considerations can be taken into account in determining whether 
the requirements of the chapeau have been fulfilled. However, there has been no case yet 
before a WTO review body in which environmental gains have been weighed in the cha-
peau, so this possibility remains unclear.  
To further ‘green’ the WTO with regard to government procurement and to provide more 
clarification on the relationship between green government procurement and the WTO, 
some recommendations are given below for policy makers in the WTO and in its mem-
ber states, as well as for researchers. 
5.2 Policy recommendations 
• Members to the GPA, including the EU and its Member States, should force the issue 
of the greening of government procurement on the agenda of the WTO negotiations 
by, for instance, linking the negotiations following the Doha Declaration on transpar-
ency in government procurement and on environmental issues in order to start a de-
bate on green government procurement within the WTO; 
• Members to the GPA, including the EU and its Member States, should undertake en-
vironmental reviews of this agreement, or should, if they undertake an environmental 
review of the entire WTO include a review of the GPA; 
• Members to the GPA, including the EU and its Member States, should suggest in 
discussions on government procurement that the exception of the GPA should also 
accommodate the other environmental exception of Article XX (g) GATT, allowing 
                                                   
171  COM (2001) 274 final. For an analysis of this communication, see Fischer (2001). See also 
Fischer-Braams and others (2002). 
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exceptions “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources”, and 
therewith allowing in theory more environmental exceptions to the GPA.; 
• Members to the GPA, including the EU and its Member States, should explore the 
opportunities of clarifying the GPA by referring cases related to green government 
procurement to the review body of the WTO. This could for example clarify that en-
vironmental benefits can be taken into account in the determination of the require-
ments of the chapeau; 
• The OECD, which has observer status in the Committee on Government Procure-
ment, should provide the WTO with information it has gathered on green govern-
ment procurement practices, to give a basis for discussions in the WTO on this topic. 
• In the current review of the GPA undertaken by the Committee on Government Pro-
curement, a more explicit mention should be made of green procurement. For that 
purpose, several ambiguous articles should be clarified. For example, it should be 
clarified if (and in the author’s opinion that) Article VI is intended to include both 
product related and non-product related PPMs; 
• In that same review, the relationship between several provisions of the multilateral 
WTO Agreements and the GPA should be clarified. For example, it should be clari-
fied whether the general exception of the GPA is indeed intended to be interpreted in 
a similar way as the general exception of the GATT; 
• Until there is an outcome of the plurilateral and multilateral discussions on govern-
ment procurement in the WTO, the Committee on Government Procurement should 
provide an informal note which at least addresses and recognizes issues of green pro-
curement, in order to provide a starting point for a debate on the greening of gov-
ernment procurement within the WTO. 
5.3 Research recommendations 
• The opportunities that the Agreement on Government Procurement offers for green 
government procurement should be examined in more detail, in order to increase le-
gal certainty. Specifically, it is desirable to examine the opportunities of green pro-
curement by including environmental criteria in: 
• The technical specifications of a tender (by requiring, for example, that products 
are certified by a certain private or public eco-label, or that they comply with the 
criteria of such an eco-label, or by specifying certain transport-related demands); 
• The qualification criteria for suppliers (by requiring, for example, that tenderers 
run certain environmental management schemes);  
• The criteria for awarding a contract. 
• The compatibility of actual green procurement practices within the territories of 
(both European and non-European) GPA members with the WTO law on govern-
ment procurement should be examined in a detailed manner, in order to increase le-
gal certainty; 
• The diverging attitudes of members and non-members to the GPA (both developed 
and developing) countries towards green government procurement should be exam-
ined, in order to create a dialogue on green procurement between different stake-
holders. 
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